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Abstract:We present the ForMaRE project which applies formal mathematical reasoning to economics. The-
oretical economics makes use of mathematical proof and we seek to increase confidence in these theoretical
results by applying formal mathematical reasoning. This will lead on the one hand to new challenge problems
in formal reasoning. On the other hand we are conducting research that connects economics and formal meth-
ods. We will discuss some areas of interest such as game theory and auctions, where we are currently building
a toolbox of formalizations.
1 Motivation of the ForMaRE Project
Theoretical economics may be regarded as a branch of ap-
plied mathematics, drawing on a wide range of mathematics
to explore and prove properties of stylized economic envi-
ronments. Proofs are error prone since typically for any
new axiom set humans have initially no or only limited in-
tuition. This way it is easy to assume false theorems and
to overlook cases in proofs. Proofs found in mathematics
in general and in theoretical economics in particular, can
be viewed from a logical point of view more like proof
plans. That is, not all details are given, hidden assumptions
may be overlooked, proof steps may be incorrect, general-
izations may not hold. Thus, any mathematical discipline,
including theoretical economics, can benefit from formaliz-
ing proofs since this will make proofs much more reliable.
However, there are other potential benefits. For instance,
in experimenting with axiomatizations it is much easier to
reuse proof efforts. Furthermore the dependencies of asser-
tions can be accessed more easily and experiments with the
computational content of theorems becomes possible which
without computer support would be time consuming and
error-prone.
Mathematical formalization and mechanized reasoning
have been applied to economics before, most prominently
to social choice theory (cf., e.g., [9], [14], [1]) and game
theory (cf., e.g., [11]). Immediately preceding the For-
MaRE project, we have ourselves formalized pillage games,
a particular form of cooperative games, and motivated this
as follows [4]:
1. Economics as a whole, but cooperative game theory
in particular, is a relatively new area for mechanized
reasoning (still in 2013) and therefore presents a new
set of canonical examples and challenge problems.
2. Economics typically involves new mathematics in that
axioms particular to economics are postulated. One
of the intriguing aspects of cooperative game theory is
that, while the mathematical concepts involved are of-
ten intelligible to even undergraduate mathematicians,
general theories are elusive. This has made pillage
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games more amenable to formalization than research
level mathematics.
Despite these potential benefits, formalization of eco-
nomics has so far been carried out almost exclusively by
computer scientists, not by economists.
2 Auction Theory
Our initial focus in the ForMaRE project were pillage
games. But then we became aware of exciting work that
has been done in areas with broader audiences than coop-
erative games and refocused and are currently looking at
auction theory (other areas of interest are mentioned in the
next section). In particular, we have formalized Vickrey’s
theorem on second price auctions which establishes that no-
body can do better in such an auction than just bidding the
own valuation of the good independent of what the other
bidders do.
Our starting point is Maskin’s work who collected high
level versions of Vickrey’s theorem and 12 others in a re-
view [6] of an influential auction theory textbook. This
sets the roadmap for building an Auction Theory Toolbox –
a collaborative effort, to which we invite volunteers (see
project home page). Four different formalizations have
been done (or are currently done). The one in Isabelle [3]
(which has been much improved with input from Makar-
ius Wenzel) is finished as is the one in Mizar (by Marco
B. Caminati). One in Theorema 2.0 (with Wolfgang Wind-
steiger) and one in CASL (with Till Mossakowski) are cur-
rently developed.
One of the insights is that the formalization as it is
found in the published paper (i.e., Maskin’s) is not de-
tailed enough to be input directly into a system. Another
is that the proof structure is not necessarily ideal for a for-
mal proof. Concretely, we would have to deal with many
more cases than necessary if we took the proof outline as
guideline for the formal proof. Furthermore, even when a
concrete structure is given, provers typically cannot prove
the related lemmas directly but additional auxiliary lemmas
need to be introduced.
In building the Auction Theory Toolbox, we are com-
paring [5] these four different systems, whose philoso-
phies cover a large subset of the spectrum: Isabelle (in-
teractive theorem prover, HOL, accessible via a document-
oriented IDE [13]), CASL/Hets (uniform GUI front end to
a wide range of automated FOL provers [8]), Theorema
(automated but configurable theorem prover, HOL appear-
ing as FOL plus set theory in the textbook-like notation of
Mathematica notebooks [15]), and Mizar (automated proof
checker, FOL plus set theory [7]).
3 Possible Application Areas
In addition to auction theory we also want to study match-
ing markets and finance markets regulation. Our aim is to
establish new results and think that some important fields
such as those we cite in the following are amenable to
formal reasoning: auctions are widely used for allocating
goods and services. Novel auctions have recently been de-
signed for allocating new top-level Internet domains [2], but
it is not known for sure whether they are efficient, i.e. giv-
ing a domain to the registrar who values it highest and is
therefore expected to utilize it best. Matching problems
occur, e.g., in health care (matching kidney donors to pa-
tients) and in education (children to schools) [10]. Impos-
sibility results are of particular interest here; they rely on
finding rich counterexamples. Finally, modern finance re-
lies on models to price assets or to compute risk, but banks
and regulation authorities still validate and check suchmod-
els manually. One research challenge is to develop minimal
test portfolios that ensure that capital models incorporate
relevant risk factors [12].
3.1 Enabling Economists to use Formalized Reasoning
Ultimately we aim at enabling economists to formalize their
own designs and validate them themselves. For users with-
out a strong computer science background, this is aggra-
vated by the complexity and abundance of formalized lan-
guages and proof assistants. Ideally there would be tool-
boxes of ready-to-use formalizations of basic concepts, in-
cluding definitions and essential properties, and guides to
extending and applying these toolboxes for different ar-
eas of theoretical economics. In order to build them, this
means:
1. identifying languages
(a) that are sufficiently expressive while still exhibit-
ing efficient reasoning tasks,
(b) that are learnable for people used to informal
textbook notation,
(c) and that have rich libraries of mathematical foun-
dations.
2. identifying proof assistants
(a) that facilitate reuse from the toolbox,
(b) whose output is sufficiently comprehensible to
help non-experts understand, e.g., why a proof
attempt failed, and
(c) whose community is supportive towards non-
experts.
4 Conclusion
Theoretical economics is an important field whose results
have significant impact on all of us. For instance, auctions
allocate trillions of dollars in goods and services every year,
but their design is still “far less a science than an art” [6].
Our Auction Theory Toolbox of basic auction theory for-
malizations aims at making it more of a science, by en-
abling auction designers to verify their own designs. We
hope that tools from the automated reasoning community
can support theoretical economics to make its results more
dependable.
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